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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT VIEWS SCIENTER
ScoTr E. RICHTERt
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."'
Like Alice in Wonderland, judges, juries and lawyers in-
volved in securities litigation often encounter words that have
many meanings. One of those words is "scienter." Does it
mean "an actual intent to defraud?" Can it mean "reckless-
ness?" If so, what does "recklessness" mean? One suspects
that each judge, juror and lawyer, like Humpty Dumpty, might
have his own special meanings for these words.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit stepped through this looking glass. In Van Dyke v.
Coburn Enter., Inc. ,2 the Eighth Circuit gave an expansive defini-
tion to the word "scienter" as it is used in cases involving the
Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and Securities & Exchange
Commission (S.E.C.) Rule lOb-5. 4 Because of the procedural
setting of the case, however, Van Dyke failed to give a full expla-
nation of the term. Like Alice, trial judges, juries and lawyers
are despairingly left to ask: "Would you tell me please,
what that means?" 5
In Van Dyke, the definitional issue regarding "scienter" arose
on an appeal from a judgment following a jury verdict. The
plaintiffs were four Minnesota farmers involved in the business
t Shareholder in the Minneapolis Office of Popflam, Haik, Schnobrich & Kauf-
man, Ltd. He received the B.A. from Stanford University in 1978. He is a 1982
graduate of the Stanford Business School and the Stanford Law School.
1. L. CARROLL, Through the Looking-Glass, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS
CARROLL 196 (1939) (emphasis in original).
2. 873 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
5. L. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 197.
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of raising and selling artichokes. In 1982 they invested in
Coburn Enterprises, which owned a plant used for processing
artichokes into anhydrous alcohol-197 proof or greater. Af-
ter some time, the investment turned sour. In part, the farm-
ers sued for violation of S.E.C. Rule lOb-5. Coburn
Enterprises asserted various counterclaims. 6
The plaintiffs' claim under Rule lOb-5 proceeded to the jury
upon the following instruction:
The plaintiffs, in order to recover on their lOb-5 claim,
must show that the defendants acted knowingly, that is, with
a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. In order to establish this element the plaintiffs
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendants stated material facts which they knew to be false or
stated untrue facts with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity or knew of the existence of material facts which were
not disclosed and they should have realized their signifi-
cance in the making of an investment decision or knew of
the existence of material facts which were not disclosed
although they knew that knowledge of those facts would be
necessary to make their other statements not misleading.
7
After the jury returned a verdict against them, the plaintiffs
challenged this instruction. Among other things, they con-
tended that the "instruction did not include recklessness," as it
is used within the definition of "scienter." 8 The court dis-
agreed with the plaintiffs and found that "reckless disregard
for ... truth or falsity" was included in the instruction. 9 The
court also found that, while a further definition of recklessness
might have been helpful, it could not say under the facts at
issue that the plaintiffs were prejudiced in any manner by the
absence of such explanation.
On its limited terms, the court's decision was correct. There
was no reversible error for the plaintiffs. Had the plaintiffs
prevailed, however, the defendants would have been substan-
tially aggrieved, and entitled to reversal. For the defendants,
,the instruction was inadequate for two reasons: (1) it included
an instruction on recklessness that was not supported by the
6. Van Dyke, 873 F.2d at 1097.
7. Id. at 1099-100 (quoting district court's jury instruction No. 24).
8. Id. at 1100.
9. Id.
[Vol. 16
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facts of the case, and (2) it failed to give any explanation of the
term "recklessness."
To provide guidance for trial judges, juries and lawyers, the
Eighth Circuit should address each of these issues in future de-
cisions. For further understanding of these issues, one must
step back into the history of Rule lOb-5 litigation. In doing so,
one gains the feeling of Alice stepping through the looking
glass.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder is
the central case on the scienter doctrine under Rule 10b-5.10
Hochfelder involved a claim against an accounting firm, Ernst &
Ernst, by plaintiffs who had lost their investment in a small
brokerage firm for which Ernst & Ernst was the auditor. The
firm was found to have been operated fraudulently. Relying
upon prevailing law, the plaintiffs based their claim against
Ernst & Ernst upon the theory that the accountants had been
negligent in failing to discover the fraud."
Ernst & Ernst took its arguments to the Supreme Court after
a favorable summary judgment motion was reversed by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ruled
for Ernst & Ernst. 12 It held that negligence was not enough to
satisfy Rule lOb-5. Rather, "scienter"-meaning an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud-was required. In a footnote,
the Court explained:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a
form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liabil-
ity for some act. We need not address here the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is suffi-
cient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.13
The Supreme Court based its opinion upon the language
and the legislative history of both the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. In particular, the
Court found that the term "manipulative," when used in com-
bination with the terms "device" and "contrivance," indicated
10. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
11. Id. at 190. Ernst & Ernst claimed that if defendant had used "appropriate
auditing procedures," the faulty internal practices of the firm would have been dis-
covered. Id.
12. Id. at 193.
13. Id. at 194 n.12.
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an intent to prohibit something more than simple negli-
gence.' 4 The Court felt that this language clearly addressed
intentional acts.' 5 Moreover, the Court noted that some sec-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act and the Securities Act
clearly do prohibit negligent conduct. Other sections of the
Acts clearly prohibit only intentional conduct. Thus, Congress
had been quite careful in crafting the scope of the various sec-
tions of these Acts.' 6 Finally, to the extent that legislative his-
tory was available, it tended to confirm that the drafters meant
to address intentional conduct.' 7
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court declined to explain further
what it meant by "scienter." Rather, it left that job to the cir-
cuit courts of appeal. Thus far, all of the courts of appeal that
have considered the issue have found that scienter can mean
more than just intentional fraud. Under certain circumstances,
the circuit courts all have found that scienter can include be-
havior characterized as "recklessness."
For one in Alice's position, the questions now become:
When can "scienter" mean "recklessness," and what does
"recklessness" mean? These are all issues that the Eighth Cir-
cuit should eventually address.
In almost all of the cases, the circuit courts of appeal have
held that recklessness only satisfies the scienter requirement in
certain limited circumstances. Those limited circumstances
arise where there is some preexisting relationship or duty be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. The cases cited by the
Eighth Circuit in Van Dyke amply illustrate this point.18 The
14. Id. at 197.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 200.
17. Id. at 201.
18. See Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th
Cir. 1985) (severe recklessness can satisfy the scienter requirement where an alleged
aider and abetter under Rule lOb-5 owed a preexisting duty to the defrauded party);
Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (cases
have held that a recklessness standard is appropriate where the alleged violator has a
duty to disclose or refrain from trading), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1981) (severe reckless-
ness standard could be applied where defendant, another accounting firm, owed a
duty of careful supervision to the investors), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1981); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 960-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (severe recklessness stan-
dard could be applied in a case involving a claimed breach of a fiduciary duty), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47
(2d Cir. 1978) (severe recklessness standard could be applied in a case in which the
[Vol. 16
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principle established in these circuit court cases is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Hochfelder. The emphasis
upon manipulative devices and contrivances reflects a clear in-
tent to address intentional wrongdoing. However, where there
is some preexisting relationship between the parties, greater
demands may be placed upon the defendants. The relation-
ship itself can be part of the device or contrivance. Reckless
conduct within that relationship may well satisfy the language
and intent of Rule lOb-5.
In Van Dyke, there was no such preexisting relationship be-
tween the parties. Thus, the instruction that recklessness
would suffice to prove scienter should not have been given.
In addition, once the jury instruction including recklessness
was given, more explanation of the term should have been in-
cluded. Jurors should not be allowed to apply their independ-
ent meanings to this multi-faceted term.
On this issue as well, the circuit courts of appeal have
reached a clear consensus. The language generally adopted
comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.i9
As the court noted in Sundstrand, this definition should be
viewed as the functional equivalent of intent. 20 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has also recog-
nized that, when dealing with Rule lOb-5, the court will re-
quire "the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to wilful
defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1977) (se-
vere recklessness standard could be applied in a case involving a "quasi-fiduciary"
who had a duty to disclose material facts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See also
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975) (scienter
must be of the high "conscientious intent" variety where there was no preexisting
duty to disclose). But see Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978)
("the ambit of § 10(b) [is] to reach a broad category of behavior, including knowing
or reckless conduct"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
19. Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1043-45 (quotation omitted).
20. Id.
1990]
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fraud." 2 1
Because of the posture of the case, the Eighth Circuit never
reached this issue in Van Dyke. Had the plaintiffs not prevailed,
however, it would have had to address the issue. The court
should then have found that more explanation of the term
"recklessness" was required.
If the Van Dyke court had reached the issue, it would also
have had to find that at least one clause of the instruction fell
short of both the Sundstrand definition and Hochfelder itself.
The jury was instructed, in part, that there could be liability if
the defendants knew of the existence of material facts which
were not disclosed, and they should have realized their signifi-
cance in the making of an investment decision. The phrase
"should have realized" left open the possibility that the jury
could have found the defendants liable on the basis of negli-
gence alone.
22
Fortunately, neither of these errors resulted in any prejudice
to the parties. The lesson, however, is that Van Dyke cannot be
taken by trial courts or lawyers as the final word on scienter.
More explanation will be required as the issues discussed here
are squarely presented in future cases. The jury instruction
which was found satisfactory in Van Dyke does not fit every case
that may arise under Rule lOb-5. It should be given only
where there is a preexisting relationship or duty between the
parties. When the instruction is given, it should be worded so
as to assure that liability will not be based only upon a finding
of negligence.
These are difficult issues for all involved. Life on the other
side of the looking glass is confusing. Often words do have
more than one meaning, and this is surely one such instance.
Perhaps Humpty Dumpty's reflections are again appropriate:
"That's a great deal to make one word mean," Alice said
in a thoughtful tone.
"When I make a word do a lot of work like that," said
Humpty Dumpty, "I always pay it extra."
23
21. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Securities
and Exch. Comm'n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
22. Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).
23. L. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 197.
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